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Abstract. We propose a new approach to solving dynamic decision problems with
rewards that are unbounded below. The approach involves transforming the Bell-
man equation in order to convert an unbounded problem into a bounded one. The
major advantage is that, when the conditions stated below are satisfied, the trans-
formed problem can be solved by iterating with a contraction mapping. While the
method is not universal, we show by example that many common decision problems
do satisfy our conditions.
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1. Introduction
Reward functions that are unbounded below have long been a stumbling block for
recursive solution methods, due to a failure of the standard contraction mapping ar-
guments first developed by Blackwell (1965). At the same time, such specifications
are popular in economics and finance, due to their convenience and well-established
properties. This issue is more than esoteric, since the Bellman equation for such prob-
lems can have multiple solutions that confound the search for optima. Computation
of solutions, already challenging when the state space is large, becomes even more so
when rewards are unbounded.
Here we propose a new approach to handling problems with values that are unbounded
below. Instead of creating a new optimality theory, our approach proceeds by trans-
forming the Bellman equation to convert these unbounded problems into bounded
1We thank Takashi Kamihigashi and Yiannis Vailakis for valuable feedback and suggestions, as
well as audience members at the Econometric Society meeting in Auckland in 2018 and the 2nd
Conference on Structural Dynamic Models in Copenhagen. Financial support from ARC Discovery
Grant DP120100321 is gratefully acknowledged.
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2ones. The main advantage of this approach is that, when the conditions stated below
are satisfied, the transformed problem can be solved using standard methods based
around contraction mappings. The technical contribution of our paper lies obtaining
suitable conditions and providing a proof that the solution to the transformed prob-
lem is equal to the solution to the original one. While the method is not universal, we
show by example that many well-known decision problems do satisfy our conditions.
Our work contributes to a substantial existing literature on dynamic choice with
unbounded rewards. The best known approach to such problems is the weighted
supremum norm method, originally developed by Wessels (1977) and connected to
economic modeling by Boyd (1990). This approach has been successful in treating
many maximization problems where rewards are unbounded above. Unfortunately,
as noted by many authors, this same approach typically fails when rewards are un-
bounded below.2
This failure was a major motivation behind the development of the local contraction
approach to dynamic programming, due to Rinco´n-Zapatero and Rodr´ıguez-Palmero
(2003), Martins-da Rocha and Vailakis (2010) and, for the stochastic case Matkowski and Nowak
(2011). This local contraction method, which requires contractions on successively
larger subsets of the state space, is ingenious and elegant but also relatively techni-
cal, which might be the cause of slow uptake on the part of applied economists. A
second disadvantage in terms of applications is that the convergence results for value
function iteration are not as sharp as with traditional dynamic programming.
Another valuable contribution is Jas´kiewicz and Nowak (2011), which explicitly ad-
mits problems with rewards that are unbounded below. In this setting, they show
that the value function of a Markov decision process is a solution to the Bellman
equation. We strengthen their results by adding a uniqueness result and proving that
value function iteration leads to an optimal policy. Both of these results are significant
from an applied and computational perspective. Like Jas´kiewicz and Nowak (2011),
we combine our methodology with the weighted supremum norm approach, so that
we can handle problems that are both unbounded above and unbounded below.
Many other researchers have used transformations of the Bellman equation, includ-
ing Rust (1987), Jovanovic (1982), Bertsekas (2017), Ma and Stachurski (2018) and
2See, for example, the discussions in Le Van and Vailakis (2005) or Jas´kiewicz and Nowak (2011).
Alvarez and Stokey (1998) find some success handling certain problems that are unbounded below
using weighted supremum norm methods, although they require a form of homogeneity that fails to
hold in the applications we consider. Ba¨uerle and Jas´kiewicz (2018) extend the weighted supremum
norm technique to risk sensitive preferences in a setting where utility is bounded below.
3Abbring et al. (2018). These transformations are typically aimed at improving eco-
nomic intuition, estimation properties or computational efficiency. The present paper
is, to the best of our knowledge, the first to consider transformations of the Bell-
man equation designed to solving dynamic programming problems with unbounded
rewards.
The rest of our paper is structured as follows. Section 2 starts the exposition with typ-
ical examples. Section 3 presents theory and Section 4 gives additional applications.
Most proofs are deferred to the appendix.
2. Example Applications
We first illustrate the methodology for converting unbounded problems to bounded
ones in some common settings.
2.1. Application 1: Optimal Savings. Consider an optimal savings problem where
a borrowing constrained agent seeks to solve
sup E
∞∑
t=0
βtu(ct)
subject to the constraints
0 6 ct 6 wt, wt+1 = R(wt − ct) + yt+1 and (w0, y0) given. (1)
Here β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor, ct, wt and yt are respectively consumption,
wealth and non-financial income at time t, R is the rate of return on financial income,3
and u is the CRRA utility function defined by
u(c) =
c1−γ − 1
1− γ
with γ > 1. (2)
We are focusing on the case γ > 1 because it is the most empirically relevant and, at
the same time, the most challenging for dynamic programming.
Assume that {yt} is a Markov process with state space Y ⊂ R+ and stochastic kernel
P satisfying4
u¯ := inf
y∈Y
∫
u(y′)P (y, dy′) > −∞. (3)
3The timing associated with the wealth constraint in (1) is such that yt+1 is excluded from the
time t information set, as in, say Benhabib et al. (2015). One can modify the second constraint in
(1) to an alternative timing such as wt+1 = R(wt− ct+yt) and the arguments below still go through
after suitable modifications. An application along these lines is given in Section 2.3.
4Here P (y, · ) can be interpreted as the transition probability. In particular, P (y,A) represents
the probability of transitioning from y to set A in one step. See Section 3.1 for formal definition.
4Condition (3) holds if, say,
• {yt} is a finite state Markov chain taking positive values (see, e.g., Ac¸ıkgo¨z
(2018) and Cao (2018)), or
• {yt} is iid and E u(yt) > −∞ (see, e.g., Benhabib et al. (2015)), or
• {yt} is a Markov switching process, say, yt = µt+σtεt, where {εt}
iid
∼ N(0, 1),
while {µt} and {σt} are positive and driven by finite state Markov chains (see,
e.g., Heathcote et al. (2010) and Kaplan and Violante (2010)).
The Bellman equation of this problem is
v(w, y) = sup
06c6w
{
u(c) + β
∫
v(R(w − c) + y′, y′)P (y, dy′)
}
, (4)
where w ∈ R+ and y ∈ Y. Since ct 6 wt, it is clear that the value function is
unbounded below. Put differently, if v is a candidate value function, then even if v is
bounded, its image
Tv(w, y) = sup
06c6w
{
u(c) + β
∫
v(R(w − c) + y′, y′)P (y, dy′)
}
(5)
under the Bellman operator is dominated by u(w) plus some finite constant, and
hence v(w, y)→ −∞ as w → 0 for any y ∈ Y.
Consider, however, the following transformation. Let s := w − c and
g(y, s) := β
∫
v(Rs+ y′, y′)P (y, dy′) (6)
so that
v(w, y) = sup
06s6w
{u(w − s) + g(y, s)} . (7)
We can eliminate the function v from (7) by using the definition of g. The first step
is to evaluate v in (7) at (Rs+ y′, y′), which gives
v(Rs+ y′, y′) = sup
06s′6Rs+y′
{u(Rs+ y′ − s′) + g(y′, s′)} .
Now we take expectations on both sides of the last equality and multiply by β to get
g(y, s) = β
∫
sup
06s′6Rs+y′
{u(Rs+ y′ − s′) + g(y′, s′)}P (y, dy′). (8)
This is a functional equation in g. We now introduce a modified Bellman operator S
such that any solution g of (8) is a fixed point of S:
Sg(y, s) = β
∫
sup
06s′6Rs+y′
{u(Rs+ y′ − s′) + g(y′, s′)}P (y, dy′). (9)
5Let G be the set of bounded measurable functions on Y × R+. We claim that S
maps G into itself and, moreover, is a contraction of modulus β with respect to the
supremum norm.
To see that this is so, pick any g ∈ G. Then Sg is bounded above, since γ > 1 implies
Sg(y, s) 6 β(sup
c>0
u(c) + ‖g‖) 6 β‖g‖,
where ‖ · ‖ is the supremum norm. More importantly, Sg is bounded below. Indeed,
Sg(y, s) > β
∫
sup
06s′6Rs+y′
{u(Rs+ y′ − s′)− ‖g‖}P (y, dy′)
= β
∫
{u(Rs+ y′)− ‖g‖}P (y, dy′) > β
∫
u(y′)P (y, dy′)− β‖g‖ > β u¯− β‖g‖.
Finally, S is obviously a contraction mapping, since, for any g, h ∈ G, we have∣∣∣∣sup
s′
{u(Rs+ y′ − s′) + g(y′, s′)} − sup
s′
{u(Rs+ y′ − s′) + h(y′, s′)}
∣∣∣∣
6 sup
s′
|g(y′, s′)− h(y′, s′)|
and hence
|Sg(y, s)− Sh(y, s)| 6 β
∫
sup
06s′6Rs+y′
|g(y′, s′)− h(y′, s′)|P (y, dy′) 6 β‖g − h‖.
Taking the supremum over all (y, s) ∈ Y ×R+ yields
‖Sg − Sh‖ 6 β‖g − h‖.
We have now shown that S is a contractive self-map on G. Most significant here is
that G is a space of bounded functions. By Banach’s contraction mapping theorem,
S has a unique fixed point g∗ in G. Presumably, we can insert g∗ into the right hand
side of the “Bellman equation” (8), compute the maximizer at each state and obtain
the optimal savings policy. If a version of Bellman’s principle of optimality applies
to this modified Bellman equation, we also know that policies obtained in this way
exactly coincide with optimal policies, so, if all of these conjectures are correct, we
have a complete characterization of optimality.
A significant amount of theory must be put in place to make the proceeding argu-
ments work. In particular, the conjectures discussed immediately above regarding the
validity of Bellman’s principle of optimality vis-a-vis the modified Bellman equation
are nontrivial, since the transformation in (6) that maps v to g is not bijective. As a
result, some careful analysis is required before we can make firm conclusions regarding
optimality. This is the task of Section 3.
6A final comment on this application is that, for this particular problem, we can also
use Euler equation methods, which circumvent some of the issues associated with
unbounded rewards (see, e.g., Li and Stachurski (2014)). However, these methods
are not applicable in many other settings, due to factors such as existence of discrete
choices. The next two applications illustrate this point.
2.2. Application 2: Job Search. As in McCall (1970), an unemployed worker can
either accept current job offer wt = zt + ξt and work at that wage forever or choose
an outside option (e.g., irregular work in the informal sector) yielding ct = zt+ ζt and
continue to the next period. Here zt is a persistent component, while ξt and ζt are
transient components. We assume that {ξt} and {ζt} are iid and lognormal, and
ln zt+1 = ρ ln zt + σεt+1, {εt}
iid
∼ N(0, 1). (10)
The worker’s value function satisfies the Bellman equation
v(w, c, z) = max
{
u(w)
1− β
, u(c) + βE z v(w
′, c′, z′)
}
. (11)
Let u be increasing, continuous, and unbounded below with u(w) = −∞ as w → 0.
For now, let u be bounded above. Moreover, we assume that
either inf
z>0
E zu(w
′) > −∞ or inf
z>0
E zu(c
′) > −∞. (12)
Condition (12) is satisfied if u is CRRA, say, since then E u(ξt) and E u(ζt) are finite.
Note that v(w, c, z) is unbounded below since utility can be arbitrarily close to −∞.
To shift to a bounded problem, we can proceed in a similar vein to our manipulation
of the Bellman equation in the optimal savings case. First we set
g(z) := βE z v(w
′, c′, z′),
so that (11) can be written as
v(w, c, z) = max
{
u(w)
1− β
, u(c) + g(z)
}
.
Next we use the definition of g to eliminate v from this last expression, which leads
to the functional equation
g(z) = βE zmax
{
u(w′)
1− β
, u(c′) + g(z′)
}
. (13)
The corresponding fixed point operator is
Sg(z) = βE zmax
{
u(w′)
1− β
, u(c′) + g(z′)
}
. (14)
7If g is bounded above then clearly so is Sg. Moreover, if g is bounded below by some
constant M , then, by Jensen’s inequality,
Sg(z) > βmax
{
E z
u(w′)
1− β
, E zu(c
′) +M
}
.
Condition (12) then implies that Sg is also bounded below.
An argument similar to the one adopted above for the optimal savings model proves
that S is a contraction mapping with respect to the supremum norm on a space of
bounded functions (Section 3 gives details). Thus, we can proceed down essentially
the same path we used for the optimal savings problem, with the same caveat that
the modified Bellman operator S and the original Bellman operator need to have the
same connection to optimality, and all computational issues need to be clarified.
2.3. Application 3: Optimal Default. Consider an infinite horizon optimal sav-
ings problem with default, in the spirit of Arellano (2008) and a large related litera-
ture.5 A country with current assets wt chooses between continuing to participate in
international financial markets and default. Output
yt = y(zt, ξt)
is a function of a persistent component {zt} and an innovation {ξt}. The persistent
component is a Markov process such as the one in (10) and the transient component
{ξt} is iid. To simplify the exposition, we assume that default leads to permanent
exclusion from financial markets, with lifetime value
vd(y, z) = E
∞∑
t=0
βtu(yt).
Notice that vd satisfies the functional equation
vd(y, z) = u(y) + βE zv
d(y′, z′).
The value of continued participation in financial markets is
vc(w, y, z) = sup
−b6w′6R(w+y)
{u(w + y − w′/R) + βE z v(w
′, y′, z′)} ,
where b > 0 is a constant borrowing constraint and v is the value function satisfying
v(w, y, z) = max
{
vd(y, z), vc(w, y, z)
}
.
The utility function u has the same properties as Section 2.2. It is easy to see that v
is unbounded below since u can be arbitrarily close to −∞. However, we can convert
this into a bounded problem, as the following analysis shows.
5Recent examples include Aguiar and Amador (2019) and Aguiar et al. (2019).
8Let i be a discrete choice variable taking values in {0, 1}, with 0 indicating default
and 1 indicating continued participation. We define
g(z, w′, i) :=
{
βE z v
d(y′, z′) if i = 0
βE z v(w
′, y′, z′) if i = 1
so that for −b 6 w′ 6 R(w + y), we have
v(w, y, z) = max
{
u(y) + g(z, w′, 0), sup
w′
{u(w + y − w′/R) + g(z, w′, 1)}
}
.
Eliminating the value function v yields
g(z, w′, 0) = βE z{u(y
′) + g(z′, w′, 0)} and
g(z, w′, 1) = βE zmax
{
u(y′) + g(z′, w′, 0), sup
w′′
{u(w′ + y′ − w′′/R) + g(z′, w′′, 1)}
}
,
where −b 6 w′′ 6 R(w′ + y′). We can then define the fixed point operator S corre-
sponding to these functional equations.
If g is bounded above by some constant K, then Sg 6 supc u(c) +K. More impor-
tantly, if g is bounded below by some constant M , we obtain
Sg(z, w′, 0) > βE zu(y
′) + βM and
Sg(z, w′, 1) > βE zmax {u(y
′) +M, u(w′ + y′ + b/R) +M}
= βE z max {u(y
′), u(w′ + y′ + b/R)}+ βM.
Hence, Sg is bounded below by a finite constant if
inf
z
E zu(y
′) > −∞. (15)
For example, (15) holds if yt = zt + ξt where {zt} is positive and E u(ξt) > −∞. An
argument similar to the one in Section 2.1 now proves that S is a contraction with
respect to the supremum norm (Section 3 gives details).
3. General Formulation
The preceding section showed how some unbounded problems can be converted to
bounded problems by modifying the Bellman equation. The next step is to confirm
the validity of such a modification in terms of the connection between the modified
Bellman equation and optimal policies. We do this in a generic dynamic programming
setting that contains the applications given above.
93.1. Theory. For a given set E, let B(E) be the Borel subsets of E. For our purpose,
a dynamic program consists of
• a nonempty set X called the state space,
• a nonempty set A called the action space,
• a nonempty correspondence Γ from X to A called the feasible correspondence,
along with the associated set of state action pairs
D := {(x, a) ∈ X× A : a ∈ Γ(x)},
• a measurable map r : D→ R ∪ {−∞} called the reward function,
• a constant β ∈ (0, 1) called the discount factor, and
• a stochastic kernel Q governing the evolution of states.6
Each period, an agent observes a state xt ∈ X and responds with an action at ∈
Γ(xt) ⊂ A. The agent then obtains a reward r(xt, at), moves to the next period with
a new state xt+1, and repeats the process by choosing at+1 and so on. The state
process updates according to xt+1 ∼ Q(xt, at, · ).
Let Σ denote the set of feasible policies, which we assume to be nonempty and define
as all measurable maps σ : X → A satisfying σ(x) ∈ Γ(x) for all x ∈ X. Given any
policy σ ∈ Σ and initial state x0 = x ∈ X, the σ-value function vσ is defined by
vσ(x) =
∞∑
t=0
βtE xr(xt, σ(xt)).
We understand vσ(x) as the lifetime value of following policy σ now and forever,
starting from current state x.
The value function associated with this dynamic program is defined at each x ∈ X by
v∗(x) = sup
σ∈Σ
vσ(x). (16)
A feasible policy σ∗ is called optimal if vσ∗ = v
∗ on X. The objective of the agent is
to find an optimal policy that attains the maximum lifetime value.
To handle rewards that are unbounded above as well as below, we introduce a weight-
ing function κ, which is a measurable function mapping X to [1,∞). Let G be the set
of measurable functions g : D→ R such that g is bounded below and
‖g‖κ := sup
(x,a)∈F
|g(x, a)|
κ(x)
<∞. (17)
6Here a stochastic kernel corresponding to our controlled Markov process {(xt, at)} is a mapping
Q : D×B(X) → [0, 1] such that (i) for each (x, a) ∈ D, A 7→ Q(x, a,A) is a probability measure on
B(X), and (ii) for each A ∈ B(X), (x, a) 7→ Q(x, a,A) is a measurable function.
10
The pair (G, ‖ · ‖κ) is a Banach space (see, e.g., Bertsekas (2013)). Moreover, at each
x ∈ X and (x, a) ∈ D, we define
r¯(x) := sup
a∈Γ(x)
r(x, a) and ℓ(x, a) := E x,ar¯(x
′). (18)
Assumption 3.1. There exist constants d ∈ R+ and α ∈ (0, 1/β) such that r¯(x) 6
dκ(x) and E x,a κ(x
′) 6 ακ(x) for all (x, a) ∈ D.
Assumption 3.1 relaxes the standard weighted supremum norm assumptions (see, e.g.,
Wessels (1977) or Bertsekas (2013)), in the sense that the reward function is allowed
to be unbounded from below.
Next, we define S on G as
Sg(x, a) := βE x,a sup
a′∈Γ(x′)
{r (x′, a′) + g(x′, a′)} . (19)
Given g ∈ G, a feasible policy σ is called g-greedy if
r(x, σ(x)) + g(x, σ(x)) = sup
a∈Γ(x)
{r(x, a) + g(x, a)} for all x ∈ X. (20)
Although the reward function is potentially unbounded below, the dynamic program
can be solved by the operator S, as the following theorem shows.
Theorem 3.1. If Assumption 3.1 holds and ℓ is bounded below, then
(1) SG ⊂ G and S is a contraction mapping on (G, ‖ · ‖κ).
(2) S admits a unique fixed point g∗ in G.
(3) Skg converges to g∗ at rate O((αβ)k) under ‖ · ‖κ.
(4) If there exists a closed subset G of G such that SG ⊂ G and a g-greedy policy
exists for each g ∈ G, then, in addition,
(a) g∗ is an element of G and satisfies
g∗(x, a) = βE x,av
∗(x′) and v∗(x) = max
a∈Γ(x)
{r(x, a) + g∗(x, a)} .
(b) At least one optimal policy exists.
(c) A feasible policy is optimal if and only if it is g∗-greedy.
3.2. Sufficient Conditions. Consider a dynamic programming problem
max E
∞∑
t=0
βtr(wt, st) (21)
subject to
0 6 st 6 wt, wt+1 = f(st, ηt+1), ηt = h(zt, εt) and (w0, z0) given. (22)
11
Here z and ε correspond respectively to a Markov process {zt} on Z and an iid
process {εt}, f and h are nonnegative continuous functions, and f is increasing in s.
Furthermore, Z and the range space of {ηt} are Borel subsets of finite-dimensional
Euclidean spaces, and the stochastic kernel P corresponding to {zt} is Feller.
7
This problem can be placed in our framework by setting
x := (w, z), a := s, X := R+ × Z, A := R+, Γ(x) := [0, w]
and D := {(w, z, s) ∈ R+ × Z×R+ : 0 6 s 6 w} .
Suppose that the reward function r : D→ R∪{−∞} is increasing in w and decreasing
in s, r is continuous on the interior of D and, if r is bounded below, it is continuous.
Recall κ defined in Assumption 3.1. Let
ℓ(z) := E zr(f(0, η
′), 0) and κe(z, s) := E z,sκ(w
′, z′).
Let G be the set of functions g in G that is increasing in its last argument and
continuous. Notice that, in the current setting, S defined on G is given by
Sg(z, s) = βE z,s max
s′∈[0,w′]
{r(w′, s′) + g(z′, s′)} .
Theorem 3.1 is applicable in the current setting, as the following result illustrates.
Proposition 3.2. If Assumption 3.1 holds for some continuous functions κ and κe,
and ℓ is continuous and bounded below, then S is a contraction mapping on (G, ‖ ·‖κ)
and the conclusions of Theorem 3.1 hold.
4. Applications
In this section, we complete the discussion of all applications in Section 2. We also
extend the optimality results of Benhabib et al. (2015) by adding a persistent com-
ponent to labor income and returns.
4.1. Optimal Savings (Continued). Recall the optimal savings problem of Sec-
tion 2.1. This problem can be placed into the framework of Section 3.2 by letting
η = z := y, r(w, s) := u(w − s), f(s, η′) := Rs+ η′ and h(z, ε) := z.
To establish the desired properties, it remains to verify the conditions of Proposi-
tion 3.2. Since we have shown that SG ⊂ G, where G is the set of bounded measurable
7In other words, z 7→
∫
h(z′)P (z, dz′) is bounded and continuous whenever h is.
12
functions on Y × R+, we can simply set κ ≡ 1 such that Assumption 3.1 holds. In
this case, both κ and κe are continuous functions. Moreover, note that
ℓ(y) = E yu(y
′) =
∫
u(y′)P (y, dy′),
which is bounded below by (3). As a result, all the conclusions of Theorem 3.1 hold as
long as y 7→
∫
u(y′)P (y, dy′) is continuous. In particular, when this further condition
holds, S is a contraction mapping on (G, ‖ · ‖) with unique fixed point g∗, and a
feasible policy is optimal if and only if it is g∗-greedy. Here G is the set of bounded
continuous functions on Y ×R+ that is increasing in its last argument.
4.2. Job Search (Continued). Recall the job search problem of Section 2.2. This
problem fits into the framework of Section 3.1 if we let the a be a discrete choice
variable taking values in {0, 1}, where 0 denotes the decision to stop and 1 represents
the decision to continue,
x := (w, z, c), X := (0,∞)3, A := {0, 1}, Γ(x) := {0, 1}, D := (0,∞)3 × {0, 1}
and the reward function r(x, a) be
r(w, c, a) :=
u(w)
1− β
if a = 0 and r(w, c, a) := u(c) if a = 1.
We have shown that SG ⊂ G, where G is the set of bounded measurable functions on
(0,∞). Hence, Assumption 3.1 holds with κ ≡ 1. Note that in this case, the function
ℓ(x, a) reduces to
ℓ(z) = E z max {u(w
′)/(1− β), u(c′)} .
Then ℓ is bounded below by Jensen’s inequality and (12). Since in addition the action
set is finite, a g-greedy policy always exists for all g ∈ G. Let G := G. The analysis
above implies that all the conclusions of Theorem 3.1 hold.
4.3. Optimal Default (Continued). Recall the optimal default problem studied
in Section 2.3. This setting is a special case of our framework. In particular,
x := (w, y, z), a := (w′, i), X := [−b,∞)× Y × Z and A := [−b,∞)× {0, 1},
where i is a discrete choice variable taking values in {0, 1}, and Y and Z are respec-
tively the range spaces of {yt} and {zt}. The reward function r reduces to
r(w, y, w′, i) :=
{
u(y) if i = 0,
u(w + y − w′/R) if i = 1.
13
Since SG ⊂ G, where G is the set of bounded measurable functions on Z× [−b,∞)×
{0, 1}, Assumption 3.1 holds for κ ≡ 1. Moreover, ℓ satisfies
ℓ(z, w′) = E zmax {u(y
′), u (w′ + y′ + b/R)} > E zu(y
′),
which is bounded below by (15). Let G be the set of functions in G that is increasing
in its second-to-last argument and continuous. Through similar steps to the proof
of Proposition 3.2, one can show that SG ⊂ G and a g-greedy policy exists for all
g ∈ G. As a result, all the conclusions of Theorem 3.1 are true.
4.4. Optimal Savings with Capital Income Risk. Consider an optimal savings
problem with capital income risk (see, e.g., Benhabib et al. (2015)). The setting is
similar to that of Section 2.1, except that the rate of return to wealth is stochastic.
In particular, the constraint (1) now becomes
0 6 st 6 wt, wt+1 = Rt+1st + yt+1 and (w0, z0) given.
where wt is wealth, st is the amount of saving, while Rt and {yt} are respectively the
rate of return to wealth and the non-financial income that satisfy
Rt = hR(zt, ξt) and yt = hy(zt, ζt).
Here {zt} is a finite state Markov chain, and {ξt} and {ηt} are iid innovation processes.
The importance of these features for wealth dynamics is highlighted in Fagereng et al.
(2016) and Hubmer et al. (2018), among others.
This problem fits into the framework of Section 3.2 by setting
η := (R, y), εt := (ξt, ζt), r(w, a) := u(w − s) and f(s, η
′) := Rs + y′.
In this case, ℓ(z) = E zu(y
′) and
Sg(z, s) = βE z,s max
s′∈[0,w′]
{u(w′ − s′) + g(z′, s′)} .
Consider, for example, the CRRA utility in (2). In this case, Assumption 3.1 holds
with κ ≡ 1, and G reduces to the set of bounded continuous functions on Z×R+ that
is increasing in its last argument. The conclusions of Theorem 3.1 hold if z 7→ E zu(y
′)
is continuous and bounded below.
5. Appendix
Let V (resp., V) be the set of measurable functions v : X → R ∪ {−∞} such that
(x, a) 7→ βE x,av(x
′) is in G (resp., G), and let H (resp., H) be the set of measurable
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functions h : D → R ∪ {−∞} such that h = r + g for some g in G (resp., G). Next,
we define the operators W0, W1 and M respectively on V, G and H as
W0v(x, a) := βE x,av(x
′), W1g(x, a) := r(x, a) + g(x, a),
and Mh(x) := sup
a∈Γ(x)
h(x, a).
Then S in (19) satisfies S =W0MW1 on G.
Proof of Theorem 3.1. To see claim (1) holds, we first show that SG ⊂ G. Fix g ∈ G.
By the definition of G, there is a lower bound g ∈ R such that g > g. Then
Sg(x, a) > βE x,a sup
a′∈Γ(x′)
{
r(x′, a′) + g
}
= β
[
E x,a sup
a′∈Γ(x′)
r(x′, a′) + g
]
= β
[
E x,ar¯(x
′) + g
]
= β
[
ℓ(x, a) + g
]
.
Since by assumption ℓ is bounded below, so is Sg. Moreover, by Assumption 3.1,
Sg(x, a) 6 βE x,a
{
r¯(x′) + sup
a′∈Γ(x′)
g(x′, a′)
}
6 βE x,a {(d+ ‖g‖κ)κ(x
′)} 6 αβ(d+ ‖g‖κ)κ(x)
for all (x, a) ∈ D. Hence, Sg/κ is bounded above. Since in addition Sg is bounded
below and κ > 1, we have ‖Sg‖κ <∞. We have now shown that Sg ∈ G.
Next, we show that S is a contraction mapping on (G, ‖ · ‖κ). Fix g1, g2 ∈ G. Note
that for all (x, a) ∈ D, we have
|Sg1(x, a)− Sg2(x, a)|
=
∣∣∣∣∣βE x,a supa′∈Γ(x′){r(x′, a′) + g1(x′, a′)} − βE x,a supa′∈Γ(x′){r(x′, a′) + g2(x′, a′)}
∣∣∣∣∣
6 βE x,a
∣∣∣∣∣ supa′∈Γ(x′){r(x′, a′) + g1(x′, a′)} − supa′∈Γ(x′){r(x′, a′) + g2(x′, a′)}
∣∣∣∣∣
6 βE x,a sup
a′∈Γ(x′)
|g1(x
′, a′)− g2(x
′, a′)| 6 β‖g1 − g2‖κE x,aκ(x
′) 6 αβ‖g1 − g2‖κκ(x),
where the last inequality follows from Assumption 3.1. Then we have ‖Sg1−Sg2‖κ 6
αβ‖g1 − g2‖κ. Since αβ < 1, S is a contraction mapping on (G, ‖ · ‖κ) and claim (1)
is verified.
Claims (2)–(3) follow immediately from claim (1) and the Banach contraction map-
ping theorem. Regarding claim (4), since G is a closed subset of G and SG ⊂ G, S is
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also a contraction mapping on (G, ‖ · ‖κ) and the unique fixed point g
∗ of S is indeed
in G. Based on Proposition 2 of Ma and Stachurski (2018), the Bellman operator
T := MW1W0 maps elements of V into itself and has a unique fixed point v¯ in V
that satisfies v¯ = MW1g
∗ and g∗ = W0v¯.
To verify part (a) of claim (4), it remains to show that v¯ = v∗. For all x0 ∈ X and
σ ∈ Σ, we have
v¯(x0) > r(x0, σ(x0)) + βE x0,σ(x0)v¯(x1)
> r(x0, σ(x0)) + βE x0,σ(x0)
{
r(x1, σ(x1)) + βE x1,σ(x1)v¯(x2)
}
= r(x0, σ(x0)) + βE x0,σ(x0)r(x1, σ(x1)) + β
2
E x0,σ(x0)E x1,σ(x1)v¯(x2)
>
T∑
t=0
βtE x0,σ(x0) · · ·E xt−1,σ(xt−1)r(xt, σ(xt)) + β
T+1
E x0,σ(x0) · · ·E xT ,σ(xT )v¯(xT+1)
=
T∑
t=0
βtE x0r(xt, σ(xt)) + β
T
E x0,σ(x0) · · ·E xT−1,σ(xT−1)g
∗(xT , σ(xT )). (23)
Notice that, by Assumption 3.1, we have∣∣βTE x0,σ(x0) · · ·E xT−1,σ(xT−1)g∗(xT , σ(xT ))∣∣
6 βTE x0,σ(x0) · · ·E xT−1,σ(xT−1) |g
∗(xT , σ(xT ))|
6 βTE x0,σ(x0) · · ·E xT−1,σ(xT−1)‖g
∗‖κκ(xT )
6 βTαT‖g∗‖κκ(x0) = (αβ)
T‖g∗‖κκ(x0)→ 0 as T →∞.
Letting T → ∞, (23) then implies that v¯(x0) > vσ(x0). Since x0 ∈ X and σ ∈ Σ are
arbitrary, we have v¯ > v∗. Moreover, since g∗ = W0v¯ and there exists a g
∗-greedy
policy σ∗ by assumption, all the inequalities in (23) holds with equality once we let
σ = σ∗. In other words, we have v¯ = vσ∗ 6 v
∗. In summary, we have shown that
v¯ = v∗. Hence, g∗ = W0v
∗ and v∗ = MW1g
∗, and part (a) of claim (4) holds.
Since we have shown that v∗ is the unique fixed point of T in V, by Theorem 1
of Ma and Stachurski (2018), the set of optimal policies is nonempty, and a feasible
policy is optimal if and only if it is v∗-greedy. Since in addition g∗ =W0v
∗, parts (b)
and (c) of claim (4) hold. 
Next, we aim to prove Proposition 3.2. For all g ∈ G and (w, z) ∈ X, we define
hg(w, z) := max
06s6w
{r(w, s) + g(z, s)} and
Mg(w, z) := {s ∈ [0, w] : hg(w, z) = r(w, s) + g(z, s)} .
The following result is helpful in applications for verifying SG ⊂ G.
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Lemma 5.1. For all g ∈ G, hg and Mg satisfy the following properties:
(1) hg is well defined and increasing in w,
(2) hg is continuous on (0,∞)× Z,
(3) hg is continuous on X if r is bounded below, and
(4) Mg is nonempty, compact-valued, and upper hemicontinuous.
Proof. Fix g ∈ G. Since g is bounded below, hg(0, z) = r(0, 0)+ g(0, z) ∈ R∪ {−∞}
and hg is well defined at w = 0. Now consider w > 0. Let D0 be the interior of D.
By assumption, either
(i) r is continuous on D0 and lims→w r(w, s) = −∞ for some w ∈ R+, or
(ii) r is continuous and bounded below.
Each scenario, since g is continuous, the maximum in the definition of hg can be
attained at some s ∈ [0, w]. Hence, hg is well defined for all w > 0. Regarding
monotonicity, let w1, w2 ∈ R+ with w1 < w2. By the monotonicity of r, we have
hg(w1, z) 6 max
s∈[0,w1]
{r(w2, s) + g(s, z)} 6 max
s∈[0,w2]
{r(w2, s) + g(s, z)} = hg(w2, z).
Hence, claim (a) holds. Claims (b)–(d) follow from Berge’s theorem of maximum
(adjusted to accommodate possibly negative infinity valued objective functions). 
Proof of Proposition 3.2. ℓ is bounded below since, by the monotonicity of f and r,
ℓ(x, a) = E z,sr(w
′, 0) > E zr[f(0, η
′), 0] = ℓ(z),
which is bounded below by assumption. Moreover, it is obvious that G is a closed
subset of G. Existence of g-greedy policies for g in G has been verified by Lemma 5.1.
It remains to show that SG ⊂ G. For fixed g ∈ G, Theorem 3.1 implies that
Sg ∈ G. To see that Sg is increasing in its last argument and continuous, note that
by Lemma 5.1, hg is continuous on D0 and increasing in w
′. For all s1, s2 ∈ A with
s1 6 s2, the monotonicity of f implies that
Sg(z, s1) = βE z,s1hg(w
′, z′) = βE zhg(f(s1, η
′), z′)
6 βE zhg(f(s2, η
′), z′) = βE z,s2hg(w
′, z′) = Sg(z, s2).
Hence, Sg is increasing in its last argument. In addition, the definition of G and the
monotonicity of r and f implies that
r(f(0, η′), 0)− α1 6 hg(w
′, z′) 6 α2 κ(w
′, z′) for some α1, α2 ∈ R+.
Since κe and ℓ are continuous and the stochastic kernel P is Feller, Fatou’s lemma
implies that Sg(z, s) = βE z,shg(w
′, z′) is continuous. 
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